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3. We cannot accept respondent's contention 
that, even though§ 287(a)(3) does not mention 
probable cause, its legislative history establishes 
~rud- t 
that Congress impl i eitiy condition~immigration # 
officers' authority to board 4W and search vehicles 
/ 
on probable cause to believe that they contained 
aliens. The legislative history simply does not 
support this contentio~. 
\ 
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May 28, 1975 
RE: Nos. 73-2050 United States v.Ortiz 
74-114 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
73-6848 Bowen v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
If your proposed memoranda in the border search case 
become opinions for the Court, I vote as follows: 
I join No. 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz. I join 
Parts I and III of No. 74-114, United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce and also Part II if you will delete 
/ 
n. 3 at p. 4. That note seems inconsistent with the 
view of Section 287(a)(3) that I expressed in my dis-
sent in Peltier. I cannot join No. 73-6848, Bowen v. 
United States in light of my dissent in Peltier. I 
would appreciate your adding at the foot of your Bowen, 
11 Mr. Justice Brennan dissents and would reverse sub-
stantially for the reasons expressed in his dissent in 
No. 73-2000, United States v. Peltier. 11 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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May 28, 1975 
No. 74-114, U. S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Lewis, 
I agree with your memorandum in 
this case and would join it as an opinion of 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
j 
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JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 28, 1975 
Re: No. 74-114, U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with your memorandum in this 
case and would join it as an opinion of the Court. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
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May 28, 1975 
RE: No. 74-114 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Lewis: 
After our discussion please note me as joining 
you in full your opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS June 4, 1975 
Dear Lewis: 
RE: UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050 
UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114 
BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848 
I 
If your memoranda in these cases become opinions for the 
Court, I vote as follows: 
In UNITED STATES V. ORTIZ, 73-2050, please join me. 
In UNITED STATES V. BRIGNONI-PONCE, 74-114, I shall file 
a separate statement concurring in the result. 
In BOWEN V. UNITED STATES, 73-6848, I shall dissent for 
reasons stated in my dissent in UNITED STATES V. PELTIER, 73-2000. 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS 
Dear Lewis: 
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June 5, 1975 
RE: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 74-114 
j 
If your memorandum in this case becomes an opinion of the 
Court I shall file the enclosed statement concurring in the 
judgment. 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
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June 6, 1975 
Re: 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
To keep you informed, my present view is that 
73-6848, Bowen v. United States, should be affirmed. 
As to 74-114, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
and 73-2050, United States v. Ortiz, I am not yet persuaded 
to affirm. 
I am glad you now avoid the "area search warrant" 
approach but I fear we may not have found the key I need to 
resolve this problem. 
As of now, in the latter two cases, I am close to 
where I was at Conference. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
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Dear Chief: 
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June 6, 1975 
Border Search Cases 
Although I am grateful for the vote in Bowen, I am 
quite disappointed that you think we have not "found the 
key" to the proper resolution of Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz. 
I write primarily to suRgest that we are unlikely to 
find five votes for any "key more to your liking. This 
is a judgment (with which you may disagree entirely) based 
on my having devoted more time to the study of these cases 
than to any other assignment you have given me this year. 
The drafts which I have circulated are in accord on 
principle with Fourth Amendment precedents, the most recent 
of which is Almeida-Sanchez. In one respect, however, it 
can be said that I have departed somewhat from precedent. 
In Brignoni-Ponce, I proposed a "reasonable suspicion" 
standard for random stopping and questioning of occupants 
of vehicles by roving patrols. This affords more leeway 
to law enforcement officers than any prior Fourth Amendment 
case with which I am familiar, although I drew heavily on 
Terry and Adams.* 
I do not believe that the "reasonable suspicion" 
standard will unduly handicap officers on roving patrol. 
*In those cases, as you will recall, the investigating 
officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
suspects were armed and that they might be dangerous. 
This is a considerably higher requirement than the "rea-
sonable suspicion" which I propose in Brignoni-Ponce. 
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I invite your attention particularly to Part IV of my 
Brignoni-Ponce opinion (p. 10-12) for the "factors [that] 
may be taken into account ·in deciding whether there is a 
reasonable suspicion to stop a car in the border area". 
With this portion of my opinion in mind, I further invite 
you to read Bill Douglas' concurrence, circulated June 5, in 
which he attacks the "reasonable suspicion" proposal. 
It is thus evident that, so long as the composition of 
the Court remains as it is now, the resolution I propose is 
likely to be the closest to your tentative views. Putting 
it differently, we have the same 5 to 4 split that decided 
Almeida-Sanchez, except that Bill Douglas would require an 
even higher standard than I propose. Absent a change in 
the personnel of the Court, it is unrealistic to think that 
the result will be different at any future Term - unless 
Justices Brennan or Marshall retreat from my position to 
that of Bill Douglas. 
It is also entirely speculative whether a change in 
Court composition will create a new majority.* We hope there 
will be no change for many years; we have no idea which Justice 
will be the first to leave; and we certainly have no idea as 
to the views of the Justice who might fill a vacancy. 
Of course, we do not have to agree on a Court opinion. 
But examples that come to mind (e.g., Metromedia) have hardly 
been satisfactory to the bench or Dar. The Border Search 
Cases present an especially pressing problem, with courts 
and U.S. Attorneys in four states awaiting definitive 
guidance. I am sure we all would regret further delay or 
a fractured Court. 
As you know, we also have pending here cases which 
present the validity of random stops for questioning at 
established checkpoints. These are perhaps the most im~ortant 
of all of these cases. I confirm what I said at Friday s 
Conference, namely, that I have carefully considered the 
*I do not imply that the possibility of a future change 
affects any of our judgments. I am merely exploring whether 
it is realistic to think the present situation will change. 
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issue, and will vote to affirm the right of the border patrol 
officers to make such stops - without requiring reasonable 
suspicion - at the established checkpoint. Potter expressed 
the same view at Conference, and has confirmed it to me per-
sonally. I think there is a vast difference between the 
circumstances of the regularized stops at established check-
points (which are quite analogous to stopping vehicles for 
license checks), and the random stops by roving patrols at 
any time of day or night on any road or highway within a 
hundred miles of the border. 
You may recall Bill Rehnquist's statement that he might 
consider joining me if I made clear that we were implying no 
view with respect to stops by state and local officers for 
such purposes as checking driver's licenses, auto registration, 
weighing trucks or enforcing agricultural quarantines. I 
attach a proposed new footnote to be added to Brignoni-Ponce. 
I do not know whether this will satisfy Bill. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
Footnote 8, for p. 9 in Brignoni-Ponce. (The note 
reference would appear after the word "Amendment" at 
the end of the long paragraph). 
8. Our decision is based on an assessment of 
the Border Patrol's function, its statutory authority 
for stopping vehicles, and the character of stops for 
quesioning in the border areas. We imply no view as to 
issues that may arise with respect to state and local 
law enforcement practices of stopping vehicles for such 
purposes as checking driver's licenses and auto 
registration, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural 
quarantines. 
74-114--0PINION 
8 UNITED STATES v. BRIGNONI-PONCE 
identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily 
while obtaining more information, may be most rea-
sonable in light of the facts known to the officer at 
the time." /d., at 145-146. 
These cases together establish that in appropriate cir-
cumstances the Fourth Amendment allows a properly 
limited "search" or "seizure" on facts that do not consti-
tute probable cause to arrest or to search for contraband 
or evidence of crime. In both Terry and AdamB v. 
Williams the investigating officers had reasonable grounds 
to believe that the suspects were armed and that they 
might be dangerous. The limited searches and seizures 
in those cases were a valid method of protecting the 
public and preventing crime. In this case as well, be-
cause of the importance of the governmental interest at 
stake, the minimal intrusion of a brief stop, and the ab-
sence of practical alternatives for policing the border, we 
hold that when an officer's observations lead him reason-
ably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain 
aliens who are illegally in the country, he m~y stop the 
car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke 
suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be 
"reasonably related in scope to the justification for their 
initiation." 392 U. S., at 29. The officer may question 
the driver and passengers about . their citizenship and 
immigration status, and he may ask them to explain sus-
picious circumstances, but any further detention or 
search must be based on consent or probable cause. 
We are unwilling to let the Border Patrol dis-
pense" entirely with the requirement that· officerS' 
must have a reasonable suspicion to justify roving-
patrol stops.7 We conclude that in the context of 
border area stops the reasonableness requi rement 
of the Fourth Ame~dment demands something more than 
the broad and unlimited discretion sought by 
the government. Roads near the border carry not only 
T Because the stop in this case was made without a warrant and 
~he officers made no effort to obtain one, we have no occasion to 
decide whether a warrant could be issued to stop cars in a d~ignated 
' I 
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aliens seeking.~ enter the country illegally, but a large 
volume of legitimate traffic as well. San Diego, with a 
metropolitan population of 1.3 million, is located on the 
b?rder. Texas has two fairly large metropolitan areas 
directly on the border: El Paso, with a population of 
360,000, and the Brownsville-McAllen area with a com-
bined population of 320,000. We are co;fident that a 
large. majority of traffic in these cities is lawful and that 
relat~vely few of their residents have any connection with 
the Illegal. entry and transportation of aliens. To ap-
prove r~vmg-patrol stops of all vehicles in the border 
area, Without any suspicion that a particular vehicle is 
carrying illegal immigrants, would subject the resident.R 
of these and other areas to interference with their 
use of the highways, solely at the discretion of 
Border Patrol officers who seek to enforce laws 
having nothing to do with the regulation of 
highway use!~The only formal limita-
tion on that discretion appears to be the administrative 
regulation detining the term "reasonable distance" in ~ 
§ 287 (a) (3) to mean withip 100 air miles from the border. 
8 CFR § 287.1 (1974). That, however is not enough 
a t least in xkxe these circumstances.·~ 
If we approved the Government's position in this case, 
Border Patrol officers could stop motorists at random for 
questioning, day or night, anywhere within 100 air miles 
of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy highway, 
?r a desert road, without any reason to suspect that they 
:1ave violated any law. Yet the cases in uhich border 
area stops have been considered establish that Exxex 
bases for reasonable suspicion are available wxxk to 
Border Patrol officers. As we discuss in Part IV, 
infra, the nature of the violations which are here 
involved naturally generate articulagle grounds for 
differentiating between violators and nonviolators. 
Even though the intrusion involved in Border Patrol 
stops is admittedly modest, we do not think it 
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment to make such 
stops on a random basis when means are available to 
~~~i:~;1 l~~~=~~~~~~c~~s~di£(s from indiscriminate I 
area on the basis of conditions in the area. as a whole and in the 
absence of reason to SUBpect that any particular car is carrying 
Jlliens. See Almeida-Sanchez, wpra, at 275 (MR. JusTICE PoWELL, 
concurring); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. 6. 523 (1967). 
, -
Footnote 15/ 
Our decision in this case is based on an assessment of the 
Border Patrol's function, theimportance of the governmental 
interests served by its stops, the character of its stops, and, 
as discussed below, the availability of alternatives to 
indiscriminate stops unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The 
decision is also one which concerns stops having nothing to do 
with an inquiry whether highway users and their vehicles are 
entitled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing highway 
usage, to be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does 
not imply that state and local law enforcement agencies are 
without power to conduct such limited stops as are necessary 
to enforce laws regarding driver's licenses, vehicle registra-
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 19, 1975 
Cases Held for No. 74-114 U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
No. 74-993 Janney v. United States 
No. 74-6150 Coffey and Sparks v. United States 
These two cases are exactly like No. 74-6016, Arnold 
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon ~n 
No. 74-6014, discussed in the memo of cases held for United 
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped 
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of 
questioning, Border Patrol officers discovered evidence 
that provided probable cause for a search. In each case 
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the Court wants to 
review the functional equivalency issue, in hopes of reaching 
the stop question, these cases should be held. If the Court 
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these 
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might 
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions 
presently before us that potentially present the issue of 
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my 
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending 
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to 
settle this remaining issue,are to Rrant one of these petitions 
despite the "functional-equivalency' hurdle, or to wait for 
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current 
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait. 
No. 74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States 
No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States 
These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the 
date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. None of the present 
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cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce 
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that 
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior 
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Govern-
ment reasonably could have continued making such stops at 
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because 
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem 
appropriate to vacate these judgments and remand to the courts 
of appeals in light of Peltier, Bowen and Brignoni-Ponce, but 
I could als·o vote to deny the petitions if that is the 
consensus. 
The rema1n1ng cases represent stops for questioning 
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable suspicion." 
In light of the decision in Brignoni-Ponce, the only issues 
raised by these petitions will e the application of that 
standard to the facts of each case. For your convenience, 
I will outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I 
intend to vote. 
No. 74-5422 Madueno-Astorga and Lopez-Saenz 
v. United States 
This petition challenges two separate inCidents. In 
the first (Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw 
Petitioner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from 
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large 
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to 
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it must be heavily 
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious 
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under 
Brignoni-Ponce. 
The second incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early 
morning hours less than half a mile from the Mexican border, 
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers." 
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's 
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally 
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the 
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the 
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana), 
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner) 
appeared to be Mexican. The officer stopped the pick-up 
l 
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suspecting it might be associated with the first vehicle, 
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim 
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but 
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer 
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny. 
No. 74-6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States 
Petitioner and a codefendant were traveling, about 
5:15a.m., in closely-following cars near the border. They 
were traveling slowly, and the trailing car did not take 
opportunities to pass the lead car. Petitioner was driving 
the lead car. Border Patrol officers followed them and 
noticed that the trailing car was riding low, despite new 
shock absorbers. It also appeared to have control problems 
on curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily 
loaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found 
marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had 
new shock absorbers but was not riding low. Deny. 
No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. United States 
Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American) 
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area 
"notorious for smuggling." The officers testified that normal 
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most 
drivers as local residents. They did not recognize Petitioner. 
When Petitioner saw the agents, he jammed on his brakes, 
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped. 
Vacate and Remand. 
No. 74-6086 Gonzalez-Diaz v. United States 
Border Patrol officers were on patrol in a ''notorious 
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:30 a.m. 
They stopped to investigate an unusually-placed rock beside 
the road and saw footprints, leading them to believe that 
aliens had been picked up there. Petitioner then drove by 
in a Pontiac sedan of a sort often used for smuggling aliens. 
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was 
traveling 20 mph in a 55 mph zone. They followed him for 
a short distance and stopped him. Vacate and remand. 
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No. 74-6259 Gonzales v. United States 
A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m. 
1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the 
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is 
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The 
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, corning from the 
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became 
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner 
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally 
succeeded in stopping the truck. Deny. 
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PERSONAL 
Re: Nos. 73-2050 -United States v. Ortiz 
74-114 - United States v. B rignoni-Ponce 
73-6848 - Bowen v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
I'm sorry to "let you down" on the Border Search cases. 
There is, of course, no Court opinion resolving these troublesome 
is sues. And the v exing aspect of the plurality opinion in Almeida-
Sanchez is that it has been followed by an unemployment figure ex-
ceeded only by the number of illegal aliens reliably estimated to be 
in the United States. 
I argue for no nexus between the two except that they coincide. 
I add to that what I said in some dissenting opinions over the past 20 
years, that we are becoming an "impotent society." With a shocking 
rise in crime, both in prosperity and recession, we are constantly --
and blandly-- telling the society we serve "you can't get there from 
here." 
Here, as elsewhere, the key lies in the irrational, monolithic, 
mechanical application of the Suppression Doctrine, fulfilling Cardozo's 
prophecy on it once a month if not more. 
You have my vote on the Border cases if you link it with a sane, 
selective use of exclusion -- as in England, Israel, and every other 
civilized country in the world save ours 1 
Mr. Justice Powell 
;onqr:n~~ '4-lmn P~ u~~ ~muu ~mue-' 
'J]iagJrht.gt~ !9. <Q:. 2ll.;i'l-' 
CHAMBERS OF 
I 
June 9, 1975 J 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Re: No. 73-2050 - United States v. Ortiz 
No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni- Ponce 
Dear Lewis: 
I am still unable to join your proposed opinions 
for these cases. I remain where I was at the time of our 
conference. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.:§u:prtmt <!Jcurlcf tlrt ~tb .§brug 
'Jiihudri:ng~ ;!0. (If. 20&f'1~ 
June 10, 1975 
Re: No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Fellow Losers: 
At this stage of the Term, it seems to be the common 
understanding that we have two choices in this case and in 
Ortiz, both of which represent extensions of Almeida-Sanchez 
in which we dissented. The first choice is to continue our 
votes to reverse the Court of Appeals, and thereby under 
Conference practice during the past few months to require the 
cases to go over for reargument next fall. The other choice 
is to try to persuade Lewis to make some modifications in his 
draft opinion in exchange for the four of us concurring 
either in the opinion or in the result. 
I think the second choice has much to be said for it for 
at least two reasons. First is that if we follow the first 
option we are apt in the long run to find that it will become 
a Court opinion in spite of our disagreement with it, and as 
presently drafted it has a good deal of potential for spill-
over into areas quite different from Border Patrol searches. 
The basic conception of the opinion, as I now read it, is that 
even though the governmental interest is significant, and the 
intrusion produced by a stop is minor, the interest of 
innocent citizens in using the highway is such that even this 
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minor intrusion will not be permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment. I am hopeful that Lewis may be amenable to 
changing some of the language in his opinion so as to shift 
its emphasis in a way that would confine the result more to . . . ---------- -tpe part~cular s~tuat~on of the Border Patrol, and l~ve open 
not merely in form but in substance t~ question of the 
/
propriety of stops where the stop is related to inquiring as 
to whether conditions imposed by law for operating a vehicle 
on a public highway have been met. 
The second reason why I think it wise to pursue the 
second alternative is that it does seem to me that we all 
have institutional responsibility for getting these cases 
decided this Term. I don't think any of those who have voted 
to join Lewis are about to change, and so the changes will 
have to come from us. If it were a case of a numerically 
evenly divided Court, it could well be argued that there is 
no more reason for us to alter our views than for those on the 
other side to alter theirs, but here there is a five man 
majority in support of Lewis' present position. 
Feeling as I do, I want to take this opportunity to 
sound out each of the three of you on the proposed changes 
in the draft opinion which are attached to this memorandum. 
I include a partial rewrite of pages 8 and 9 of the May 24th 
circulation, together with a typed footnote "7a" following 
revised page 9, and an insertion on page 11 of the phrase 
"give rise" to the present word "add" in the eighth line on 
that page. 
. 
I have no idea whether these changes would be satisfactory 
to Lewis, and I am quite sure they might produce some objections 
on the part of others who have joined his present draft. But 
here we do have some bargaining strength. Lewis has proposed 
to me a somewhat pro forma footnote which would go on page 9 
of the present draft and read as follows: 
{ 
- 3 -
"Our decision is based on an assessment 
of the Border Patrol's function, its 
statutory authority for stopping vehicles, 
and the character of stops for questioning 
in the border . areas. We imply no view as 
to issues that may arise with respect to 
state and local law enforcement practices of 
stopping vehicles for such purposes as 
checking driver's licenses and auto registra-
tion, weighing trucks, or enforcing agricultural 
quarantines." 
While this adequately reserves these issues in form, 
I do not regard it as being nearly as satisfactory as the 
proposed changes in language which I have incorporated in 
the attachments to this memorandum. I have heard enough 
discussions in three and a half years of Conference to 
realize that a simple footnote in a case saying, "We do not 
decide this question," is not always thought by everybody 
who joins the opinion to mean exactly what it says, and I 
would like to make sure that the opinion itself is structured 
in such a way-aB to genuinely reserve these issues. 
If that is done, I would propose something very generally 
along the following as a concurrin statement for as many of 
the four of us as agree with it, probably to be issued in the 
name of the Chief Justice, as our senior and mentor, or in Byron's 
name, if he were willing, since he authored the dissent in 
Almeida-Sanchez: 
"We dissented from1he Court's decision 
in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 
U.S. 266 {1973), and we are of the view 
that the Court's decision in this case 
represents a still further extension of 
departures taken in that case. Nonetheless, 
because a majority of the Court adheres 
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to Almeida, and believes that this case 
should be similarly resolved, we [join in 
the Court's opinion] [concur in the result]. 
"We think it quite important to point 
out, however, that the Court's opinion and 
reasoning deal only with the type of stop 
involved in thiS case. We think that just 
as travelers entering the country may be 
stopped and searched without probable cause 
and without founded suspicion because of 
'national self protection reasonably requiring 
one entering the country to identify himself 
as entitled to come in, and his belongings as 
effects which may be lawfully brought in, ' 
Carroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132, 154 
(1925), a strong case may be made for those 
charged with the enforcement of laws condition-
ing the right of vehicular use of a highway to 
likewise stop motorists using highways in order 
to determine whether they have met the qualifica-
tions prescribed by applicable law for such use. 
See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 u.s. 433, 440-441' 
(1973); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 
(1972). We regard these and similar situations, 
such as agricultural inspections and highway 
roadblocks to apprehend known fugitives, as not 
in any way constitutionally suspec~ .by re~on ~f - _ 
today's decision.~ w.Jt-1 ~d Cff7 ~
. 
I would appreciate receiving your reaction to this very rough 
and tentative proposal. 
The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Sincerely,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR. 
.§u:p-untt <!Jourl of t!rt ~tlt .§faf.tg 
2fllr~$Jrittgfott. IIJ. <!J. 2!l,?J.1~ 
June 16, 1975 
Brignoni-Ponce and Ortiz 
Dear Bill, Potter and Thurgood: 
You may recall that at our Conference on June 6, (when 
these cases were discussed) Bill Rehnquist indicated that if 
the opinions were clarified in certain respects, he might 
reconsider his position. 
I followed up with Bill and he identified two particular 
concerns: (i) that our opinions would not apply to state 
regulation of highway use, such as enforcement of laws with 
respect to driver's licenses, truck weights and the like; 
and (ii) that we not foreclose a different decision with 
respect to stops for questioning at established checkpoints. 
In my view, the draft opinions as circulated left open 
both of these issues, as neither was addressed. Bill, however, 
has a different view, and he rejected as inadequate some minor 
language changes I suggested. He then submitted counter-
proposals that were quite lengthy. 
As the result of negotiations, I submitted the changes 
which are now reflected in the pages of Brignoni-Ponce and 
Ortiz which I enclose herewith for each of you. Without 
comm1tting himself, Bill has indicated an inclination to join 
us if we adopt these changes. Prior to seeing my counter-
proposals Bill had conferred with the Chief Justice, Byron 
and Harry with inconclusive results. I do not think my 
proposals have been seen by these gentlemen, as Bill thought 
it best to know first whether we would submit them to the 
Conference. · 
I am willing to make these changes in the draft op1n1ons. 
They certainly do not affect the result of the holdings or 
change the basic rationale. I expect all of us would come 
out at about the same place on the right of the states 
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reasonably to govern highway usage. There may be differences 
between us as to mere stops at established checkpoints. 
Although Byron expressed the view that our decision in 
Brignoni-Ponce would necessarily foreshadow a similar holding 
with respect to all other stops, I do not agree with him. 
In any event, the changes which are necessary to satisfy 
Bill will still leave each of us free to decide the fixed 
checkpoint stop issue as we deem proper. 
In sum, I think we have a chance now to bring these cases 
down. We will have settled conclusively the "search" issue 
at fixed checkpoints as well as by roving patrols; and we also 
will have settled the "stop" issue with respect to roving 
patrols. These decisions will go far toward resolving the 
doubt which now overhangs the entire Border Patrol operations. 
In view of time constraints as well as the importance 
of a resolution, I suggest that the four of us meet to discuss 
the situation. If agreeable, perhaps we could convene in 
Bill Brennan's office at say 11:00 a.m. today if this is 
convenient. If Mary Fowler will let Sally Smith know, she 
will advise Thurgood and Potter. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 






THE CHIEF .JUST ICE 
June 23, 1975 
Re: No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni - P on ce 
Dear Bi ll: 
Please show me as joining your concurrence 
but I may join only the judgment, thereby limiting my 
concurrence. 
I will act as soon as Lewis' "whole package'' 
is clear to me. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMeERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.:§n:p:rmtt OJonrl of tqt~lt ~Udtg 
~Mlfi:nghttt. :!fJ. Qf. 20gi'!~ 
June 25, 1975 
Re: No. 74-114 - United States v. Brignoni-Ponce 
Dear Bill: 
I am writing separately in the above and I 
think it better to have that stand alone, so please 
withdraw my 11 join11 of June 23. 
Regards, 
LJ fl..,_ 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 





June 19, 1975 
Cases Held for No. 74-114 u.s. v. Brignoni-Ponce 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 74-993 Janney v. United States 
No. 74-6150 Coffey and Sparks v. United States 
These two cases are exactly like No. 74-6016, Arnold 
v. United States, and the petition of Bylund and Dixon In 
No. 74-6614, discussed in the memo of cases held for United 
States v. Ortiz. In each case the petitioner was stopped 
at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint and, in the course of 
questioning, Border Patrol officers discovered evidence 
that provided probable cause for a search. In each case 
CAS relied on its decision in Hart. If the COurt wants to 
review the functional equivalency issue, in hopes of reaching 
the stop question, 'these cases should be held. If the Court 
vacates and remands in the other cases, I think these 
petitioners should receive the same treatment. I might 
add that these Sierra Blanca cases are the only petitions 
presently before us that potentially present the issue of 
stops for questioning at checkpoints. I was in error in my 
memorandum of May 23, in suggesting that several pending 
petitions presented this issue. Our options, if we want to 
settle this remaining issue and to firant one of these petitions 
despite the "functional-equivalency hurdle, or to wait for 
a petition that presents the issue cleanly. My current 
inclination is to vacate and remand these petitions and wait. 
No. 74-5062 Quiroz-Reyna v. United States 
No. 74-5307 Baca v. United States 
These petitions involve stops conducted prior to the 




cases will decide whether the principles of Brignoni-Ponce 
should be applied retroactively. I believe, however, that 
the rationale of Peltier and the lower-court decisions prior 
to Almeida-Sanchez would lead to a conclusion that the Govern-
ment reasonably could have continued making such stops at 
least until the date of decision in Almeida-Sanchez. Because 
we are not deciding the retroactivity question, it would seem 
appropriate to vacate these judgments and remand to the courts 
of appeals in light of Peltier, Brw~ and Brignoni-Ponce, but 
I could also vote to deny the pet t ons if that is the 
consensus. 
The remaining cases represent stops for questioning 
upheld by the courts of appeals on "reasonable suspicion." 
In light of the decision in Bri~noni-Ponce, the only issues 
raised by these petitions will e the application of that 
standard to the facts of each case. For your convenience, 
I will outline the facts in each case, and indicate how I 
intend to vote. 
No. 74-5422 Maduens-Astoraa and Lopez-Saenz 
v. United States 
This petition challenges two separate indicents. In 
the first {Madueno-Astorga), Border Patrol agents saw 
Petitioner's car on an Interstate Highway 10 miles from 
the border, at 6:50 a.m. They said that the car had a large 
trunk and a heavy-duty suspension system, and appeared to 
"drift" on curves. They concluded that it 111.1st be heavily 
loaded, so they stopped it. There were no other suspicious 
circumstances preceding the stop. Vacate and remand under 
Brignoni-Ponce. 
The second incident (Lopez-Saenz) occurred in the early 
morning hours less than half a mile from the Mexican border, 
in an area "heavily used by alien and narcotic smugglers." 
The officer tried to stop a Ranchero pick-up (not Petitioner's 
vehicle). It tried to run him off the road, but he finally 
stopped it. The driver jumped out and fled, leaving the 
pick-up in a ditch. Within 2 to 4 minutes (and before the 
officer discovered that the pick-up contained marijuana), 
another Ranchero pick-up came by. The driver (Petitioner) 
appeared to be Mexican. The officer stopped the pick-up 
.· 
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suspecting it might be associated with the first vehicle, 
and found marijuana in plain view. Petitioner does not claim 
standing to challenge the stop of the first pick-up, but 
contends that there was no reasonable basis for the officer 
to suspect that he was associated with it. Deny. 
No. 74-6003 Alvarez-Garcia v. United States 
Petitioner and a codefendant were traveling, about 
S: 15 a.m., in dosely-following cars near the border. They 
were traveling slowly, and the trailing car did not take 
opportunities to pass the lead car. Petitioner was driving 
the lead car • . Border Patrol officers followed them and 
noticed that the trailing car was riding low, despite new 
shock absorbers. It also appeared to have control problems 
on curves, leading the officers to believe it was heavily 
loaded. The officers stopped the rear car and found 
marijuana, then stopped Petitioner's car, which also had 
new shock absorbers but was not riding l~w. Deny. 
No. 74-6061 Rocha-Lopez v. United States 
Border Patrol officers saw Petitioner (a Mexican-American) 
at 6:40 a.m. on a road 1-1/2 miles from the border in an area 
"notorious for smuggling." The officers testified that normal 
traffic at that hour is light and that they can identify most 
drivers as local residents. They did not recognize Petitioner. 
When Petitioner saw the agents, he jammed on his brakes, 
reducing his speed to 10 mph. On these facts he was stopped. 
Vacate and Remand. 
No. 74-6086 Gonzalez•Diaz v. United States 
Border Patrol officers were on patrol in a "notorious 
smuggling area" 7-1/2 miles from the border at 2:30 a.m. 
They stopped to investigate an unusually-placed rock beside 
the road and saw footprints, leading them to believe that 
aliens had been picked up there. Petitioner then drove by 
in a Pontiac sedan of a sort often used for smuggling aliens. 
He was Mexican, a stranger to the officers, and he was 
traveling 20 mph in a SS mph zone. They followed him for 




No. 74-6259 Gonzales v. United States 
A Border Patrol officer was on patrol at 5:20 a.m. 
1-1/2 miles from the border on a road that parallels the 
Rio Grande. The area between the highway and the river is 
sparsely populated and is often used by smugglers. The 
officer saw Petitioner's truck top a levee, coming from the 
border, and turn its headlights on. The officer became 
suspicious and signaled the vehicle to stop. Petitioner 
tried to run him off the road, but the officer finally 
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